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Using tract-level data fromthe 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses, weestimate
how the income-tax-relatedbenefits to owner-occupiers aredistributed
spatially across the United States.Even though the top marginal taxrate
has fallen substantially since1979 and the tax code moregenerally has
become less progressive, the taxsubsidy per household or owner was
almost unchanged between 1979and 1989 and then rosesubstantially
between 1989 and 1999.
Geographically1 gross program benefitshave been and remain spatially
targeted. At the state level,California's owners have received adispro-
portionate share of thesubsidy flows over the past twodecades. Their
share of the gross benefitsnationally has fluctuated from 19 to22 percent.
Depending on the year, these percentagesrepresent from 1.8 to 2.3 times
California's share of the nation's owners.The median ratio of the shareof
tax benefits to the shareof owners has declined over time,from 0.83 in
1979 to 0.76 in 1999.
We are grateful to the NationalBureau of Economic Research andthe Research Sponsor
Program of the Zell/Lurie Real EstateCenter at Wharton for supporting thisresearch, and
to Daniel Feenberg, JimPoterba, and Steven Sheffrin for helpfuladvice and comments. Dan
Siinundza provided excellent research assistance.176Sinai&Gyourko
Examining the data at themetropolitan-area level finds aneven more
dramatic spatial targeting anda spatial skewness that is increasingover
time. Comparing benefit flows in 1979in the top 20 areas versus those in
the bottom 20 areas finds thatowners in the highest subsidyareas
received from 2.7 to 8.0 times the subsidyreaped by owners in the bottom
group. By 1999, the analogous calculation findsowners in the top 20 areas
receiving from 3.4 to 17.1 timesmore benefits than owners in any of the
20 lowest recipient areas. Despite theincreasing skewness, the top sub-
sidy recipient areas tend to persistover time. In particular, the high-
benefit-per-owner areas are heavilyconcentrated in California and the
New York CityBoston corridor. Whiletaxes are somewhat higher in these
places, it is high and rising houseprices that appear most responsible for
the large and increasing skewnessin the spatial distribution of benefits.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that the favorabletax subsidy to homeownership
in the United States stimulates the demandfor housing, raising prices and
increasing the homeownership rate.1The fact that this subsidycomes at a
significant cost is also well documentedat the national level, with several
authors having estimated thetax expenditure associated with themort-
gage interest and property tax deductionsas well as the untaxed return
on housing equity.2
Over time, these marginal incentivesfor homeownershipand the
aggregate cost of these subsidieshave changedconsiderably. For exam-
ple, Poterba's (1992) analysis of theimpacts of the various tax reforms of
the 1980s reports a significantincrease in the marginal cost ofowner-
occupied housing between 1980 and 1990across the entire income distri-
bution and particularly for high-incomeowners, mostly because of a drop
in marginal tax rates for high-incomehouseholds and an overall reduc-
tion in the progressivity of the taxcode. Even so, we calculate that the real
cost of the tax subsidy to homeownershiphas risen substantially in the
last 20 years, from $198 billion (in1999 dollars) in 1979, to $284 billionin
1989, and to $420 billion in 1999.
In addition, recent evidence showsthat the value of the subsidyto
owner-occupied housing varies dramaticallyover space. In an earlier
See Rosen (1979) for a classic analysis, andsee Bruce and Holtz-Eakjn (1999); Capozza,
Green, and Hendershou (1996); and thereport to the Ford Foundation by Green and
Reschovsky (2001) for more recentinvestigatiom into how the tax code might functionin these instances.
2For example, see Follain and Ling (1991), Follain,Ling, and McGill (1993) and Follain and Melamed (1998).The (Un)changing Geographical Distributionof Housing Tax Benefits177
study (Gyourko and Sinai, 2003), using 1990 censusdata, we found that
the benefits of the tax subsidy are highlyskewed, with just a handful of
metropolitan areas reaping most of the net gainsfrom the favored tax
treatment of owner-occupiers.
These sets of stylized facts naturally lead one towonder whether the
changes over time in marginal incentivesfor homeownership and in the
aggregate cost of the homeownershipsubsidy have also affected the geo-
graphic distribution of the benefits. Because housingmarkets are inextri-
cably tied to physical location and are notnational in scope, knowing the
extent to which the tax benefits varyspatially is important for determining
the potential impact of any change in the taxtreatment of owner-occupied
housing. The nature of the spatial distributionof benefit flows is likely to
be important for any considerationof the potential impacts on house
prices, the homeownership rate, or thepolitical economy of fundamental
tax reform.
In addition, knowing how thegeographical distribution of program
benefits changes is also useful for analysisof the spatial equity of the tax
treatment of owner-occupied housing. Every year,for example, the Tax
Foundation (Moody, 2003) calculates each state'sratio of federal spending
received to taxes paid and finds substantialvariation across states. Our
results, that the benefits of the subsidy toowner-occupied housing vary
spatially, suggest that this sort of calculationshould include implicit tax
expenditures and subsidies alongside theobservable taxes and spend-
ing. Indeed, many of the Tax Foundation's stateswith the lowest ratios
of spending to actual taxes paid are the samestates whose homeowners
receive the largest housing-related subsidies.
In this paper, we examine how thespatial distribution of the tax sub-
sidy to owner-occupied housing changed overthree decades. Using the
1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses, we calculatethe value of the tax subsidy to
owner-occupied housing as the difference in ordinarystate and federal
income taxes currently paid by homeownersand the taxes they would
pay if the tax code treatedthem like landlords. In the latter scenario,there
is no preference for investing in one'shome relative to other assets.
We find that the marginal tax subsidyfor homeownership has de-
creased over the last 20 years on net, but theaggregate value of the tax
benefits actually increased. Our analysis indicatesthat this increase is due
to rising house prices and thegrowth in the number of homeowners
more than offsetting the declinein average tax benefit per dollar of house.
In particular, the after-tax costof a dollar of owner-occupied housing
rose between 1979 and 1989,before falling slightly by 1999, as the mar-
ginal tax rates on housing deductions werereduced and then increased.
If all other factors were held constant, onewould expect the value of the178Sinai & Gyourko
tax benefit to fall with tax rates. However, this scenario doesnot occur at
the per-owner level, where the benefit remained flatduring the 1980s
before rising by 20 percent during the 1990s. The factthat the aggregate
subsidy rose substantially during the 1980s, from $198 billionin 1979 to
$284 billion in 1989, is due at least in part to growth in thenumber of
homeowners.
Regarding the spatial distribution of the subsidy, thesetax changes,
increases in house prices, and growth in the number ofhomeowners were
not individually neutral. However, they happen to offset eachother so
that, at the state level, the spatial distribution of thetax benefits changes
little over time. At the metropolitan-area level, however,spatial skewness
of the subsidy has been increasing. This phenomenonappears to be
driven by the relatively large increases in the price ofhouses experienced
in various coastal areas of California and in theNortheast between New
York City and Boston. Even so, the top recipientstend to persist; they just
receive a larger fraction of the total subsidyover time.
Among states, California always receives the largestgross subsidy flow,
but this distribution is not due solely to the fact thatit has the most own-
ers. For example, in 2000, it received 18.7 percent of the aggregate subsidy,
although it had only 9.4 percent of the nation'sowners. That high ratio of
benefits to owners applies to onlya small number of other states (such as
New York, with 9.5 percent of total benefit flow while beinghome to only
5.3 percent of the nation's owners in 2000), indicatingthat this program
has highly spatially targeted beneficiaries. Thispattern of spatial skew-
ness related to the flow of program benefits is evenmore extreme at the
metropolitan-area level. Comparing subsidy flows in 1979in the top 20
areas versus those in the bottom 20 areas finds that owners in the high
recipient areas received from 2.7 to 8.0 times the subsidyreaped per
owner in the bottom group. By 1999, the analogous calculation finds the
typical owner in the top 20 areas receiving from 3.4to 17.1 times more
benefits than owners in any of the 20 lowest recipientareas.
The precise economic implications of these results dependon whether
or not the subsidy is capitalized into land prices. While suchan analysis
is well beyond the scope of this paper, the broadrange of possible out-
comes can be readily understood. If the subsidy were fully capitalized,
eliminating it would not affect theuser cost of owning, but many owners
in a few metropolitan areas would experience significantchanges in
wealth. While the savings associated with eliminating thesubsidy would
be redistributed back to homeowners, thenet wealth effect could still be
significant in many areas, regardless of howone thinks the tax benefits are
financed. If the tax subsidy is not capitalized into landprices, then the
user cost of ownership must reflect it.The (Un)changing Geographical Distributionof Housing Tax Benefits179
The remainder of the paper is organized asfollows. In section 2, we
describe the tax subsidy to owner-occupiedhousing and how we
measure it. Section 3 reports ourresults, beginning with an analysis of
how benefits flow across states,followed by a description of the dis-




The fact that there is a subsidy toowner-occupied housing can be seen
most easily by comparing the current taxtreatment of homeowners to
how they would be taxed if housing weretreated like any other asset. In
particular, owner-occupied housing getsfavorable tax treatment, but
housing owned by a landlord is treated like anyother income-producing,
depreciable asset. Both homeowners and landlords areallowed to deduct
mortgage interest and property taxes as expenses(as long as the home-
owner itemizes). But a landlordmust pay tax on her rental income, while
a homeowner does not.The homeowner implicitly pays herself rent to
occupy her house, but becauseshe is both landlord and tenant, that trans-
fer is tax-free. If the parties were distinct,however, the rent would be
taxed. On the other hand, landlords can deductdepreciation and mainte-
nance, while homeowners cannot.
It is apparent from this comparisonthat the tax subsidy to owner-
occupancy arises largely fromthe nontaxation of the implicit rent on the
home. It is not so straightforward, however, tocompute the amount of the
benefit. Implicit rent is unobserved, and thecomponents of landlords' tax
bills are often difficult to estimate. Instead, as weshow below, it is much
more straightforward tocalculate the difference between the equilibrium
taxes paid by homeowners andlandlords. Underlying this approach is the
same assumption used inthe familiar user-cost-of-owning concept devel-
oped in Hendershott and Slemrod (1983)and Poterba (1984): the marginal
homeowner invests in owner-occupied housinguntil the point where the
annual cost she incurs exactly equals the rentshe would have to pay as a
tenant in the same property
We begin with the equilibrium annualflow cost of owning. That user
cost is described in equation (1)and takes into account the fact that
implicit rental income is untaxed, while mortgageinterest and property
taxes are deductible for itemizers:
RH=(l tded)aH(ltded)tp+(t r)(l a)r
+(1 'c)+M+_11H (1)180Sinai & Gyourko
The left-side variable, RH, is the annual cost ofowner occupancy per dol-
lar of housing value. This cost includes (1) the after-taxcost of mortgage
interest, (1- tded)ai, where a is the loan-to-value ratio on the house, i is
the mortgage interest rate, and'Cded is the owner-occupier's marginal tax
rate equal to her marginal rate (denoted 'r) if she itemizes andzero oth-
erwise; (2) the after-tax cost of property tax payments, (1- 'ded)tp, with
equal to the effective property tax rate; (3) the after-taxopportunity cost
of investing equity in the house rather than insome other riskiess invest-
ment at rate of return, r, given by (1- 't)(1 - a)r and is a cost to all own-
ers, whether they itemize or not;3 (4) an after-tax risk premium, (1-
to account for the difference in risk between bonds and housing, which
applies to the entire long position in the house and thusis unaffected by
the choice of leverage;4 (5) annual maintenancecosts per unit of housing,
which are given by M; (6) the cost of true economicdepreciation per unit
of house, which is assumed tooccur at rate ö; and (7) any annual appreci-
ation in the house value, 11H, which reduces the carrying cost.5
If the homeowner were treatedas a landlord, the residence would be
taxed just like any other asset. Neutral tax treatment obviouslyrequires
taxing the implicit rental income on the home, but if treated likeland-
lords, owner-occupiers would also be ableto deduct maintenance
expenses and depreciation, not just the mortgage interest and localprop-
erty taxes presently allowed. In this case, a different annualcost would
result, as described in equation (2):
RH'=(l 'r)ai+(l r)'r+(l 'r)(l a)r+(j.'t)13+'CRH
(2)
We assume that the opportunity cost of tying up equity ina house is foregoing taxable
returns. If the homeowner were to invest in a tax-exempt asset instead,we assume the return
would be (1 - 'r)r rather than r, yielding the same after-tax ret-urn.
In this framework, the homeowner's financial positioncan be thought of as being long one
house and short one bond (the mortgage). This approach allowsus to decompose the oppor-
tunity cost of being long one house as the riskless rate of return plusa premium that reflects
the difference in risk between a bond position andan equivalent-risk alternative to invest-
ing in housing. The difference between the mortgage interestrate and the equivalent-
duration riskiess rate is reflected in the options to defaulton or prepay the mortgage. These
options have value to the owner, so the premium above the risklessrate for borrowing is
rolled into the mortgage rate as a cost.
This specification treats capital gains on housingas untaxed and realized every year.
Because a $250,000 capital-gains exclusion ($500,000 for marriedcouples filing jointly) can
now be applied every other year, this approach is not unrealistic. Even in earlierperiods,
the assumption of no capital-gains taxation on housingwas valid for the vast majority of
households.The (Un)changing Geographical Distribution of Housing TaxBenefits181
With perfect competition in the rental housing market, rents mustequal
the armual cost, so 'rRH' would be the tax due onimputed rent.6 Grouping
the RH' terms and dividing both sides by (1 - 'v) yieldsthe simplified ver-
sion in equation (3):
RH,=ai+cP+(1_a)r+13+M+t5_HH (3)
One possible strategy for estimating the tax benefits of owner-occupancy
is to compute RH' as the sum of the terms on the rightside of equation (3),
add that value to the homeowner's reported income, andthen determine
the additional tax that would be paid. This approach has twoimportant
drawbacks. One is that we do not have good data on maintenance,depre-
ciation, or expected capital gains, so the estimate islikely to be a noisy
one. The other is that simplyadding the implicit rent to income does not
accurately capture the impact of itemization rates becausethe tax rates on
deductions differ for nonitemizers.
The alternative strategy we pursue in this paper is to computethe dif-
ference between RH' and RH directly by subtracting equation(1) from
equation (3):
RH' R=tdedUl + 'Cded'('Cp) +'c[(1 - a)r + (4)
This approach shows the impact of itemization correctly,and the terms
we would have the mostproblems measuring accurately (M,,and 11)
difference out in the subtraction. Thus, the tax subsidy to owner-occupancy
can be computed as the sumof three components: (1) the tax value of
home mortgage interest deductions('tded i), (2) the tax value of local
property tax deductions('Cded.
6This resuilt also assumes accrual taxation of capital gains that, whencombined with stain-
tory ordinary income and with capital-gains rates beingequal, allows us to focus on pro-
gram benefits arising from differential tax treatmentof ordinary income. As our 2003 paper
(Gyourko and Sinai, 2003) shows, in this setting a dollar of house priceappreciation has
approximately the same value to owner-occupiers and landlords, so there is nodifferential
impact on user costs. The analysis behind this conclusion is fairlycomplex, and we refer the
interested reader to our 2003 paper for the details.
Note that we have abstracted throughout from the amount of housingdollars on which a
homeowning family receives a subsidy. A change in the tax treatmentof owner-occupied
housing might affect house values, but because we measure thesubsidy on a per-dollar
basis, we abstract from the possibility that there is a second-ordereffect through changes in
house prices. We follow this approach for two reasons. First, determiningprecisely how a
change in the subsidy would be capitalized into house values isbeyond the scope of this
paper. Second, any change in house price wouldonly increase the magnitudes of our esti-
mates. For example, if the benefit to owner-occupied housing werereduced, house prices
might also fall, further decreasing the subsidy.











FIGURE 1. Calculating the Value of the Tax Subsidy
paid on the equity invested in the home had it been invested elsewhere
tint[(1 - a)r + f3]}.8 While the sum of these three terms represents total
ordinary income tax benefits to owner-occupiers under the current code,
we hasten to emphasize that this does not imply that mortgage interest
or local property tax deductions themselves are responsible for creating
the subsidy. As noted above, the subsidy arises from the nontaxation of
imputed rent and merely can be represented algebraically by the three
terms on the right side of equation (4). Looking at the deductions alone
would underestimate the true subsidy.
2.1 Estimation Strategy and Data
The procedure for estimating the tax-code-related subsidyto owner-
occupiers is represented graphically in the tax schedule with threemar-
ginal tax brackets shown in Figure 1. A homeowning family withno
housing-related deductions would have a taxable income (YE) of Y1. If they
were not owners, however, they may have invested their housing equity in
8 The depreciation term nets out becausewe have assumed that landlords cam deduct eco-
nomic depreciation and, after 1986, that assumption is probably not far from the truth.
Deloitte and Touche (2000) and Gravelle (2001) conclude that economic lifetimes for rental
properties in 1989 (and now) are somewhat shorter than the statutory lifetimes. The statu-
tory depreciable life in 1981 (of 15 years) was shorter than true economic depreciation,so we
may overestimate the subsidy to owner-occupiers in 1979.The (Un)changing Geographical Distribution ofHousing Tax Benefits183
a vehicle that yielded ataxable return that would raise their TI to Y2. Thus,
Y2 is the counterfactual TI for a homeowningfamily if it were to stop
being an owner. Starting with that TI, we cancompute the tax value of
each of the three aforementioned deductions.With a taxable income of Y2,
this hypothetical family would have a taxliability of T1. Assume that
claiming the home mortgage interest (HMI)deduction would lower TI to
- HMI(presuming for simplicity that all of HMI wasabove the stan-
dard deduction) and the tax liability to T2.Therefore, the tax savings for
this family from the mortgage interest deductionis T1 - T2.
In this example, the mortgage interestdeduction does not move the
family into a lower tax bracket, but the propertytax deduction does.
Beginning with TI equal to Y2 - HMI, we can computethe tax savings
from the property tax deduction as the taxbill with only the mortgage
interest deduction, T2, minus the tax billwith both the mortgage interest
and property tax deductions, T3. In this case, T2and T3 span a kink in the
tax schedule, but they still accountfor the fact that the average tax rate is
less than the marginal tax rate at Y2 - HMI.
Finally, we compute the value of the nontaxationof the return on hous-
ing equity. Because the return on housingequity is not included in TI, tax-
able income is measured at Y1 instead ofthe greater amount 1'2. The
tax value of not including that incomeis measured as the change in tax
between T3 (the tax bill corresponding to a TIof Y2 - HMI - T) and T4 (the
tax bill corresponding to a TI of Y1 -HMI - Tn).
It is apparent from Figure 1 that theorder in which the deductions are
taken matters when the tax schedule is not linear.For example, T1 - T2>
T3 - T4, even though HMI < Y1 - Y2.After adding back the implicit return
on housing equity, we computethe deductions in the following order:
(1) tax savings from the mortgage interestdeduction, (2) the tax savings
associated with the property tax deduction, and (3)the savings from the
return on housing equity not beingtaxed. We have repeated the esti-
mation using all six possible sequences inwhich the deductions can be
taken. While the relative magnitudes ofthe categories change, the differ-
ences are minor.
We calculate each of the tax liabilities T1through T4 by combining tract
level information covering the entire United Statesfrom the STF3 files of
the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses(U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1980, 1990, 2000) with the National Bureauof Economic Research (NBER).
TAXSIM program (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993).TAXSIM calculates fed-
eral and state tax liabilities from our taxdata and allows us to engage
in a "what if" calculation to determinewhat taxes would have been
paid had a household not had varioushousing deductions or had
invested in an asset with a taxable income stream.For each year in our184Sinai & Gyourko
data, the TAXSIM program incorporates all relevant federal andstate tax
law, including housing and property tax deductions.
To construct representative households topass through the TA)(SIM tax
calculator, we start by computing the distribution of householdincome
among homeowners at the tract level.9 For each tract, we divide the
household income distribution into deciles and assign the medianincome
for each decile to all the households in that category Thus, theone-tenth
of the households with the lowest-income is assumedto have an income
equal to that of the fifth percentile for the tract, thenext lowest-income
tenth of the households is assigned an income equalto that of the 15th
percentile for the tract, and so forth.
We then map tract-level informationon the distribution of house val-
ues, PH,tO incomes by assigning to households in each decile of the income
distribution the value corresponding to thesame decile of the house value
distribution. For example, we assume that the householdin the 5th per-
centile of the income distribution for the tract alsoowns the home in the
5th percentile of the housing price distribution for thesame tract.1°
The actual value of the tax benefits dependson certain demographic
data that are likely to affect the number of exemptions andthe overall
amount of deductions. Tract-level data that are available in eachcensus
year include the distribution of households according to their description
as single, married, or single with children; the percentage of households
with children; and the percentage of households withat least one
member over 65 years of age. We createa representative household for
each possible combination of these characteristics and thencompute the
weighted average estimated tax, where the weightsare the tract-level dis-
tributions of the demographic characteristics.
The census data lack informationon most non housing categories of
potential tax deductions. We compute mortgage interest,state tax, and
property tax deductions, but we do not observe medicalexpenses, charitable
All tax-benefit figures reported in this.paperare based on tract-level data that aggregates
household income across its various sources.
10This matching process presumes that owners and renters ina tract have identical income
distributions. Fortunately, our spatial results are robust to assumingan extreme case in
which all the owners in a tract have a higher income thanany of the renters, and houses are
matched to owners so that the highest-income ownerowns the highest-value house, the next
highest-income owner occupies the next highest-value house, andso forth. In reality, any
sorting into houses by income would not be perfect,as is suggested by the data in
O'Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrmn (1995), who match tax returns andproperty tax assessments
in California. Unfortunately, those data are no longer available. Forthe 1989 data, however,
we have tried using the mean income and house value in each tract, rather than the fulldis-
tribution, and it does not make any qualitative differenceto the spatial skewness we
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giving, deductible interest (otherthan for a home mortgage), andseveral
other miscellaneous categories. Twocountervailing problems arise from
underestimating possible deductions. First, wewould be more likely to
assume incorrectly thatthe family does not itemize.This error would
cause us to underestimatethe tax value of the mortgage interestand
property tax deductions becauseless would be deducted at the margin.
On the other hand, omittingdeductions for itemizers could increasethe
tax value we do measurebecause the remaining deductions areapplied
against higher marginal tax rates.Consequently, we impute missing tax
deductions to our census data based ondata from the Department of the
Treasury's Statistics of Income (SOT)public-use tax microsample. A mod-
ified Heckman-style sample selectionmodel is employed to correct for the
selective observing of deductionsonly by itemizers.11
Following the procedure shown in Figure1, we augment the observed
income by an estimate of howmuch higher the household's income
would have been had its membersinvested in an equivalently risky tax-
able asset rather than housing. First, wecalculate the opportunity cost of
the equity in one's home, or PH*[(1 - a)*r + 3}, where r is the risldessyield
on seven-yearTreasuries in the relevant census year:9.47, 8.57, and 5.79
percent, respectively. Then we compute: the risk premiumfor the whole
house.12 The estimates below assumethat the expected equivalent-risk
opportunity cost of investing in ahouse is equal to the geometric mean on
the value-weighted Standard &Poor's S&P500 return (including divi-
dends) over a certain time period. Forsimplicity, we assume that the rel-
evant period always runs fromthe beginning of 1926 to the end ofthe
census year (i.e.,1926-1979, 1926-1989, and 1926-1999),yielding expected
The interested reader should see theappendix to Gyourko and Sinai (2003) for a detailed
description of the procedure. The imputationresults indicate that, without the correction,
we would haveunderestimated deductions and therefore the numberof itemizers. This
turns out to be important because theunderestimation of itemizers was not random across
space. In high-house-value andhigh-income-tax states such as California, notobserving
nonhousing deductions only infrequently caused us tomiscategori.ze an owner family as a
nonitemizer. Home mortgage interest, local propertytaxes, and state income taxes generally
were sufficient to make Californiaresidents itemizers. This scenario was not the casein
many states with lower housevalues and lower state taxes. Hence, theimputation has an
important effect on the measured spatialdistribution of program benefits.
The risk adjustment follows from Poterba(1991), with the calculation effectively assum-
ing that the mortgage rate would be theyield on seven-year Treasuries in the absence ofthe
options to prepay or default. Otherassumptions regarding the relative risk of owner-
occupied housing obviously could be made because noclear agreement exists on this issue.
However, we have repeated all the analysesreported in the paper under widely varying
assumptions about the relative risk ofowner-occupied housing. While the aggregate sub-
sidy certainly does vary with the presumedopportunity cost of equity in the home, the
nature of the spatial distribution ofthe subsidy across states and metropolitan areasis
largely unaffected.186Sinai&Gyourko
returns of 8.79, 10.13, and 11.22 percent, respectively.The risk premium is
the difference between this yield and therisk-free yield. Thus, for 1989,
we defineto be the 10.13 percent S&P500 return minus the8.57 percent
Treasury yield, for a premium of 1.56percentage points. The opportunity
cost of riskless equity and the risk premiumare then added to income.
We estimate the value of the mortgage interestdeduction by computing
each tract-decile's tax valueas the weighted average difference in tax bills
with and without it. The mortgageinterest deduction itself is definedas
PH*a*i. Leverage ratios, a, vary byage and are computed from household
data in the Survey of Consumer Finances(SCF) closest in time to the rele-
vant census year. A weightedaverage leverage for each tract was com-
puted based on the tract'sage distribution.13 The mortgage interest rate, i,
was calculated by taking an average across households inthe same SCFs.
From the 1983 SCF, which is the closestin time to 1979, we calculate the
average mortgage rate to be 10.21 percent. For 1989, theanalogous rate
was 9.56 percent, with a rate of 7.85 percent matched fromthe 1998 SCF
to the 1999 census data.
The tax value of the mortgage interest deductioncan differ from mort-
gage interest paid times the marginal tax rate for threereasons. First, only
families that itemize on their taxreturns receive any benefit on themar-
gin from the deductibility of mortgage interest.Also, only the excess of
the mortgage interest deduction plus otheritemized deductions over the
standard deduction has value fora taxpayer. Therefore, we would multi-
ply only the portion of mortgage interest inexcess of the standard deduc-
tion (after itemizing all other non-housing-relateddeductions first) by the
tax rate. Because the tax schedule is nonlinear, takingthe mortgage inter-
est deduction may lower the taxpayer's marginaland average tax rates.
The second component involves the valueof the deduction of local
property taxes. Property tax payments themselvesare defined as PH*CP,
where 'r, is the average effectiveproperty tax rate. We were not able to
find reliable estimates for this variableover time. Consequently, we use
information for an intermediate year-1990.14This variable is allowed to
vary by metropolitan area using data provided by StephenMalpezzi, who
13There is considerable heterogeneity in leverage byage in all years. For example, in 1998,
loan-to-value ratios by age are as follows: 20- to24-year-olds: 66.5 percent, 25- to 29-year-
olds: 64.2 percent, 30- to 34-year-olds: 62.6percent, 35- to 39-year-olds: 61.0 percent, 40- to
44-year-olds: 52.3 percent, 45- to 49-year-olds: 44.5percent, 50- to 54-year-olds: 41.3 percent,
55- to 59-year-olds: 30.9 percent, 60- to 64-year-olds:21.3 percent, 65- to 69-year-olds: 13.2
percent, 70- to 74-year-olds: 9.6 percent, and 75-year-olds, andolder: 4.6 percent. Leverage
in previous decades is lower, on average.
14Property taxes are such a small component of the totalsubsidyabout 10 percentthat
the noise in this measure probably has little qualitativeeffect on our conclusions.The (Un) changing GeographicalDistribution of Housing Tax Benefits187
has calculated average property tax ratesin 1990 for a large number of
areas. Census tracts notlocated within metropolitan areascovered in the
Malpezzi data are assigned the averagestate-level local property tax rate
as reported bythe Advisory Commission onIntergovernmental
Relations (ACIR)(1987).15 The tax value of the deduction associatedwith
these payments is thencomputed the same way as for the mortgage
interest deduction.
The third term we estimate arisesfrom the fact that the government
does not tax as income the return homeownerscould have earned on their
equity had they not invested intheir homes. We calculate the reductionin
tax liabilities that occurswhen we remove the imputed incomethat we
had added in the first step. Thisapproach accounts for the possibility that
a family might moveinto a higher marginal tax bracketif the return on its
housing equity were taxed.
3. RESULTS
31 Summary Statistics forthe Nation
The national aggregate gross value to ownersof housing-related ordinary
income tax benefits, reportedin the second column of Table 1, isquite
large and has risen over timefrom$198 billion in 1979 to $284 billion in
1989, to $420 billion in 1999 (inconstant 1999 dollars).'6 Thesesubsidies
are large and aresignificantly higher than those typicallyreported by the
Treasury or the Joint Committee onTaxation primarily because those gov-
ernment agencies calculate onlythe traditional tax expendituresthe tax
cost of the mortgage interestand property tax deductionsratherthan
the failure to tax implicit rent. Becausehouses are leveraged only partially
and the expected return on a house isgreater than mortgage rates,those
deductions measure only a portionof the true tax expenditure.17 Inaddi-
tion, our figures include state taxsubsidies.
'The ACIR did not report state-by-statebreakdowns for 1989, so we use the 1987 data. We
have also experimented with assuming a1 percent and a 1.5 percent national averageeffec-
tive rate. Our findings are not sensitive tothese changes.
The bulk of the tax-code-related benefits to ownersarises from the third of the three com-
ponents from equation (4). Depending onthe census year, from two-thirds to three-quarters
of the total benefits are due to not having to pay tax onthe return to equity invested in the
home plus the difference in expected return onhousing versus the cost of the mortgage.
Results on the decomposition of the subsidy areavailable on request.
17Our estimates of the tax savings fromthe mortgage interest deduction alone are quite
close to, but lower than, what we obtainby looking at actual tax return data. We cannot use
the Statistics of Income (501) data to computethe full tax expenditure because tax return
data do not include information abouthouse values, only itemized deductions. Inaddition,
the SOl data do not report state of residencefor taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI)188Sinai & Gyourko
TABLE 1
Aggregate Tax Subsidy, National Level, byYear
Year Total (billions of $1999)Per owner ($1999)Per household ($1999)
The housing subsidy is sizableandgrowingeven on a per-owneror
per-household basis. While theaggregate real subsidy amount increased
112 percent since 1979, the number ofowner-occupied units rose just 70
percent between 1979 and 1999 (from 40.9 million in1979 to 69.7 mfflion
in 1999), so the subsidy per owner-occupiedhousehold has been increas-
ing. Gross program benefitsper owner-occupied household were $4,840
in 1979, remained constantover the ensuing decade (with the 1989 figure
being $4,818), and then rose in the 1990sto $6,024 in 1999. The analogous
figures on a per-household basisrange from just over $3,000 in 1979 to just
over $4,000 in 1999.
While it has long been understood that thesubsidy is skewed in aggre-
gate toward those with high incomes and highhouse values, much less is
known about the spatial skewness of thisaspect of the tax code. We turn
now to this issue. We begin by documenting just how thetax subsidy to
owner-occupied housing is skewed, describe howthat skewness changes
over time, and then investigate the factors drivingany changes in the dis-
tribution of the subsidyacross states and metropolitan areas.
3.2 State-Level Results
While we will focus most ofour analysis on the amount of tax benefitsper
owner, we begin with the most basic measure of thespatial distribution of
the benefits: the aggregate benefit flowfor each state by year. Notsur-
prisingly, the most populous state, California,stands out in Table 2, with
its owners receiving gross benefits ofnearly $40 billion in 1979, wellover
$60 bfflion in 1989, and almost $80 billionin 1999. No other state
approaches these levels, although the benefitflow to New York has risen
dramatically over time. A closerexamination shows that, as the national
aggregate value of the subsidy increases, the additionalbenefits appear to
be distributed in rough proportionto where they were already going.
above a threshold, so our calculations using theSOI are also below the true figure. On the
other hand, projected tax expenditure on mortgageinterest deductions for 1999 (these do not
include state taxes) from the Joint Committeeon Taxation's (1998) is slightly lower than
what we calculate.
1979 $197.9 $4,840 $3,023 1989 284.0 4,818 3,121
1999 420.1 6,024 4,015The (Un)changing GeographicalDistribution of Housing Tax Benefits189
TABLE 2
Aggregate Benefit Flow in Billions of$1999 by State,
1979, 1989, and 1999
Continued
State 1979 1989 1999
Alabama $1.80 $2.25 $4.18
Alaska $0.38 $0.40 $0.67
Arizona $2.69 $3.23 $6.55
Arkansas $0.65 $1.17 $2.09
California $38.07 $63.73 $78.66
Colorado $3.37 $3.07 $8.56
Connecticut $4.29 $8.10 $8.23
Delaware $0.58 $0.89 $1.20
District of Columbia $0.99 $1.23 $1.41
Florida $8.61 $11.83 $19.62
Georgia $3.63 $5.30 $10.49
Hawaii $1.81 $2.70 $2.91
Idaho $0.43 $0.65 $1.55
Illinois $9.92 $11.87 $19.71
Indiana $3.01 $3.31 $6.13
Iowa $1.43 $1.70 $3.07
Kansas $1.77 $1.94 $2.93
Kentucky $1.28 $1.89 $3.81
Louisiana $2.22 $2.04 $3.49
Maine $0.54 $1.37 $1.59
Maryland $4.53 $7.42 $9.56
Massachusetts $5.12 $11.84 $14.03
Michigan $10.39 $9.92 $17.59
Minnesota $4.11 $4.14 $7.67
Mississippi $1.01 $1.11 $2.00
Missouri $2.61 $3.64 $6.11
Montana $0.43 $0.49 $1.04
Nebraska $0.76 $0.85 $1.67
Nevada $0.82 $0.93 $2.30
New Hampshire $0.64 $1.60 $1.74
New Jersey $8.96 $15.01 $17.60
New Mexico $0.84 $1.12 $2.15
New York $15.20 $32.99 $39.72
North Carolina $2.59 $5.03 $10.54
North Dakota $0.26 $0.27 $0.41
Ohio $8.09 $7.82 $13.32
Oklahoma $1.77 $1.72 $2.67
Oregon $2.87 $2.50 $6.48
Pennsylvania $8.80 $10.45 $13.82
Rhode Island $0.80 $1.48 $1.49
South Carolina $1.48 $2.48 $4.76
South Dakota $0.23 $0.24 $0.48
Tennessee $2.26 $2.84 $5.61That is, while the aggregate benefit to Californiadoubles between 1979
and 1999, so does the subsidy to small beneficiariessuch as Georgia,
Maryland, and North Carolina. Thus, thestates tend to maintain their
same relative standing, but the absolute (real) dollar differencebetween
the highest and lowest recipient increases substantially.
Of course, changes in aggregate subsidy flowsare heavily affected by
population growth. To net out differentialincreases in the number of
homeowners, Figure 2 reports benefits scaled bythe number of owners in
each state in 1979 and 1999.18 Evenon a per-owner basis, people in only a
handful of states, often the most populousstates, reap substantially more
from tax-code-related housing benefits thanthe typical owner nationally.
For example, while California isno longer the extreme outlier it was in the
aggregate data in Table 2, it is still one of onlyseven states that received
at least $6,000 per owner in 1979 and at least $8,000per owner in 1999.
Overall, the per-owner subsidies in thetop few states are well over dou-
ble those received by owners in the vastmajority of states. Thus, while the
Gini coefficients for the distribution ofper-owner benefits across states
are relatively low in each decade (0.20 in 1979, 0.32 in 1989,and 0.25 in
1999), it would not be accurate to considerthe benefit distribution an
especially egalitarian one in spatial terms.
Although the subsidy per owned unit has risenover time, the skewness
has persisted at least since 1979. Benefit flowsare always concentrated in the
hands of owners in just a few states, and thetop three states have remained
at the top for the last 20 years. The spatial distributionhas changed some,
however, with owners in northeastern states doing betterover time.
Of course, Figure 2 confounds changes in thenational level of subsidy
with its distribution across space. However, thetypical state receives less
than the national average benefitper owner, with a few states receiving
18Data for all three years-1979, 1989, and 1999arereported in Appendix Tables A and B,
which are available in NBER Working Paper 10322 andat www.nber.org/ data/tpel8.
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TABLE 2Continued
State 1979 1989 1999
















0 1979 Subsidy per owner-occupied unit 1999 Subsidy per owner-occupied unit
FIGURE 2. Average Tax Benefits perOwned Unit, by State, in 1979
and 1999
about double the average. These disparitiesrise between 1979 and 1989 but
are mitigated somewhatby
1999.19To isolate the spatial distribution from
the dollar value of the subsidy, wehave computed the ratio of each state's
share of the subsidy to its share ofthe nation's owners. For example, the
median state has a ratio of subsidy share to ownershare of 0.83 in 1979,0.71
in 1989, and 0.76 in 1999. Theseratios are generally less than half of
California's numbers, which are 1.77 in1979,2.29 in 1989, and 2.00 in1999.20
Figures 3 and 4 provide moredetail on the heterogeneity in benefit
changes by state over the 1980s and1990s. Both figures measure each
state's changes relative to the national averagechange. Figure 3 shows
that owners in northeastern andmid-Atlantic states did better than aver-
age in the 1980s. Californiaand Hawaii are the only exceptions tothat
statement. There was less heterogeneityin the 1990s, when owners in the
19While one cannot compute transfers across stateswithout making assumptions regarding
how the program is financed, it seems certain thattransfers are flowing from a host of states
to owners in California and a selectfew other states. See our 2003 paper (Gyourkoand Sinai,
2003) for transfer estimates assuming lump-sumand proportional financing schemes using
1990 data. In both cases, the outcome is themajority of states transferring resources to own-
ers in the smaller numberof other states.
20While ratios for Hawaii and the District ofColumbia are higher in each decade, ratios for






















FIGURE 3. Change in Average Benefitsper Owner Relative to National
















FIGURE 4. Change in Average Benefitsper Owner Relative to National
Average, by State, 1 989-1999 ($1999)
less populous western states of Colorado, Oregon,and Utah experienced
significantly greater than average increases. Ownersin California and
Hawaii received smaller thanaverage benefit flow increases that decade.
As suggested in the introduction,many factors have changed over time
that could influence the value of the tax benefitsassociated with owner
occupancy. The most obvious is the tax rates themselves. Becauseowner-The (tin) changing Geographical Distributionof Housing Tax Benefits193
occupied housing is a true tax shelter in the sensethat one can deduct
expenses without declaring anyincome on the asset, a reduction in tax
rates naturally lowers the valueof the tax shelter. Figure 5 plots the "aver-
age" marginal tax rate (state plusfederal) on housing deductions for 1979
and 1999, calculated using the censusdata and the NBER's TAXSIM pro-
gram. While marginal ratesdo differ across states, these differenceshave
declined over time. Overall, marginal ratesfell significantly during the
1980s and then rose modestly duringthe 1990s because of a series of tax
reforms at the federal level.21
However, aggregate benefits roseand benefits per owner did not
decline on average between 1979 and1989; these facts indicate other fac-
tors were changing tocounterbalance the negative effect that an increase
in the tax price of housing wouldhave on the value of the benefit. In addi-
tion, the fact that most of the importanttax changes were at the federal
level may help explain why the natureof the spatial distribution across
states was not affected much.
Of course, other components of thesubsidy, house prices in particular,
were changing. Figure 6graphs mean house price by state in 1979,1989,and
1999. Figure 7 reports the percentage changes overtime for each state. Values
in many of the coastal states inparticular have skyrocketed over the past 20
years. In California, meanreal prices rose from just over $200,000 in 1979 to
nearly $300,000 in 1999. The change has been even moredramatic in places
like Massachusetts, where the averagehome was worth a little more than
$100,000 in 1979. One decade later, mean priceshad doubled (in real terms),
and prices held firm in Massachusettsduring the 1990s. It seems clear
that this type of change has allowedthe average subsidy per owner
in Massachusetts to rise so much overthe past two decades. Indeed, a com-
parison of Figures 3, 4, and 7 suggeststhat rising real house prices can help
account for the dramatic increases inbenefits per owner that have occurred
in a small number of states,especially northeastern states, in the 1980s.
Of course, other factors, including the risingreturn in equity markets,
which raises the value of the tax shield onhome equity in our calcula-
tions, are also at work. While adetailed decomposition analysis of
changes in the tax benefit over time isbeyond the scope of this paper, the
data show that the factors that do changedid so in a largely offsetting
fashion with respect to the spatial distribution acrossstates in the 1980s.
The rise in aggregate and per-ownerbenefits in the 1990s probably reflects
21Like tax rates, the probability of itemizingdeclined significantly between 1979 and 1999,
reducing the subsidy to owner-occupiedhousing. Changes in the spatial distribution of
itemizers, once one nets out the effect of house prices onthe likelihood of itemization, do not
seem to determine the changes inthe benefits. This result is not surprising because we saw
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FIGURE 7. Percentage Change in Mean House Prices,by State, in
1979-1989 and 1989-1999
a growing share of households that are owners, rising real house prices,
and increasing tax rates. On net, the spatial distributionof benefits across
states is fairly skewed in each census year, with fewstates experiencing
significant changes in their relative status. Whether thisholds at the met-
ropolitan-area level is the subject of the following subsection.
3.3 Metropolitan Area-Level Results
In this subsection, we disaggregate the data furtherto examine subsidy
flows at the metropolitan-area level and find that the distributionof hous-
ing benefits is more skewed than at the state level andthat skewness isThe (Un)changing Geographical Distribution of HousingTax Benefits197
increasing over time. Results are computed for380 areas that were identi-
fiable census Core-Based Statistical Areas(CBSAs)?
Aggregate benefit flows at the CBSA level,which are reported for
selected areas in appendix tables A and B, documenthow extremely spa-
tially targeted are the overall benefitflows.23 The vast majority of metro-
politan areas receive a relatively modest benefitflow, while a relatively
small number of areas receive large aggregatebenefit flows.
This form of spatial skewness also has increased overtime at the met-
ropolitan-area level. For example, if we focus onthe three CBSAs that
contain the nation's three largest cities, NewYork City, Los Angeles, and
Chicago, their homeowners received benefitflows equal to $27.3 billion
in 1979. While being home to just 10.1 percentof all owners living in des-
ignated metropolitan areas in the 1980s, these ownersreceived 14.7 per-
cent of all benefits flowing tometropolitan census tracts. By 1989, the
spatial skewness of aggregate tax subsidy flowshad become even more
extreme. Owners in just these threeCBSAs received 17.7 percent of all
metropolitan-area benefits while constituting an evensmaller share of
the nation's owners, at 9.3 percent. The shareof owners in these areas
had fallen to 8.5 percent by 1999, but their benefitshare was 1.72 times
higher, at 14.6 percent.
Figure 8 plots benefits scaled by the numberof owners in the CBSA.
The figure highlights the fact that the subsidyflows disproportionately
toward owners in a relatively small number ofmetropolitan areas and
that the skewness is increasing over time.In this figure, CBSAs are
ordered by their per-owner subsidy. Thus, the more extremecurvature in
the graphs as the decades progress is anindication that spatial skewness,
net of population changes, has been onthe rise.
This scenario is made even more clear in Tables 3and 4, which report
the top and bottom 20 CBSAs in terms ofbenefits per owner in 1979 and
1999, respectively. (We limit our consideration tothe 179 CBSAs that are
22Benefit flows to census tracts not located within CBSAs are notincluded in the figures
reported in this section. CBSAs are the new (2003)county-based definition of metropolitan
areas from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.We apply the same definition in each of the three
census files, knowing that the economicrelationship among the counties is weaker, of
course, in previous decades. By construction, aCBSA must contain at least one urban area
of 10,000 or more population. The county (or counties) "inwhich at least 50 percent of the
population resides within urban areas of 10,000 or morepopulation, or that contain at least
5,000 people residing within a single urban area of 10,000 or morepopulation, is identified
as a 'central county" and isincluded in the CBSA. Additional "outlying counties" are
included in the CBSA if they meet specified requirements ofcommuting to or from the cen-
tral counties.






















Per-owner benefits ($1999), 1979
Metropolitan area, sorted by benefit amount
Per-owner benefits ($1999), 1989
Metropolitan area, sorted by benefit amount
(c) Per-owner benefits ($1999), 1999
Metropolitan area, sorted by benefit amount
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9The (LJn)changing GeographicalDistribution of Housing Tax Benefits203
above the median in terms of thenumber of households.24) The tables also
include per-household values of thesubsidy, although the sorting is on a
per-owner basis.
These two tables demonstrate thewide disparities in the size of benefit
flows across places. For example,Table 3 documents that, in 1979, an
owner in one of the top20 areas received from three toeight times the
benefit flow of an owner in one ofthe bottom 20 areas.The differentials
are narrower on aper-household basis, with households inthe top 20 areas
receiving benefit flows that are from twoto four times those in thebottom
20 areas. While differences inownership rateswhich are lower in the top
subsidy areasdo account for someof the gap between the top and bottom
recipient areas, the disparity is stifilarge, even on a per-household basis.
Based on 1999 data, the figures inTable 4 indicate that the differentials
widened considerably over the ensuing twodecades. For example, a com-
parison of the per-owner subsidyin the twentieth highest-ranked area
(Lake County-Kenosha County IL-WI,Metropolitan Division) with the
same figure for thetwentieth lowest-ranked area (Scranton-Wilkes-Barre,
PA, Metropolitan StatisticalArea [MSAI) finds a ratio of 3.4 to1or 1.3
times the ratio for theanalogously ranked areas in 1979. Comparingthe
benefit-per-owner value in the tenthhighest-ranked area (Honolulu, HI,
MSA) with that for the tenthlowest-ranked area (Fort Smith, AR-OK,MSA)
finds a ratio of 5.6 to 1whichis 1.5 times the ratio for similarlyranked
areas in 1979. Thedisparity widens even further whencomparing the top-
ranked area (San Francisco-SanMateo-Redwood City CA, Metropolitan
Division) to the bottom-ranked area(McAllen_Edinberg-Pharr, TX, MSA)
in terms of benefit per owner,with a ratio of 17.1 to 1 ($26,385 to$1,541).
Thus, the top recipient areas werereceiving relatively more per areathan
the bottom-ranked areas in 1999than in 1979. The benefits flowing to
owners in the top areas roseby 50 to 100 percent in real terms,while they
were flat or declinedslightly in the bottom-ranked areas.
An even clearer face can be put onthe skewness depicted in Figure 8by
examining who and where the topand bottom recipient areas are on a
per-owner basis. Fourteenof the top 20 areas appear inboth 1979 and
1999. They include Honolulu,HI; Bridgeport_StaflfOrdN0ralk, CT;
MD; Lake County-Kenosha County
24The top 20 areas in terms of benefits per owner arealmost unchanged by restricting the
sample to more populous areas containing morethan the median number of households.
This situation is not the case among thebottom 20 areas. If the full sample of 380 CBSAsis
used, Texas is even more overrepresentedbecause it contains a large number of less popu-
lous metropolitan areas.
25These ranges were determined by computingthe ratio of benefit per owner in the top-
ranked area versus the bottom-ranked area,from th& second- to highest-ranked area versus
the second- to lowest-ranked area,and so forth.204Sinai & Gyvurko
ILWI; and ten areas spanning the lengthof California's coastline. By
1999, a series of areas, primarily located alongthe New York CityBoston
corridor (Suffolk CountyNassau County, NY;New YorkWayneWhite
Plains, NYNJ; CambridgeNewtonFrangh,MA; BostonQuincy,
MA; and NewarkUnion, NJPA) joined thetop-20 list, replacing mid-
western areas such as Ann Arbor, MI; WarrenFarmingtonHillsTroy, MI;
and MilwaukeeWaukesha_West Allis, WI, alongwith Anchorage, AK,
and WashingtonArlington_Alexandria,DCVAMDWV Thus, the top
recipient areas have become evenmore dominated by coastal areas, with
the Northeast being muchmore heavily represented in the 1999 rank-
ings.26 There is less stabilityamong the 20 bottom ranked areas, with 10
present in both 1979 and 1999. Thisgroup always has a strong southern
representation (especially, but not exclusively, becauseof Texas), and the
metropolitan areas tend not to be situated alongthe Atlantic or Pacific
coasts.
Tn sum, the spatial skewness of benefit flowsper owner has grown over
time, with the top areas now receiving large multiplesof the subsidy received
by the bottom areas. Geographically, thisskewness now is a bicoastal phe-
nomenon, with metropolitan areas spanning the state of Californiaand the
area between New York and Boston dominating the top 20benefit-per-owner
rankings. Still, strong persistence existsover time in the areas that receive the
most benefits, and their share of the total has beenrising.
Because the most important tax-code changestend to have occurred at
the federal level, plots of tax rates andtax-rate changes at the metropol-
itan level are not particularly helpful inincreasing our understanding of
these results. In contrast, examining houseprices over time at the local
level is illuminating. For example, the plotsin Figure 9 show the distri-
bution of mean house values by metropolitanarea over time, and they
look strikingly similar to the distributionsof benefits per owner in Figure
8. While incomes and tax ratesare somewhat higher in coastal metropol-
itan areas, these differencesare not nearly as pronounced as they are for
house values. Thus, rising real houseprices, especially in key coastal
metropolitan areas, augmented by generallyhigher tax rates in those
areas, are increasing the absolute and relative benefitsflowing to their
owners. Because the method of financing for housing hasonly a second-
order effect (through itemization)on the value of the subsidy, it is not
necessary for households to refinance their housesto increase their sub-
sidies. Higher prices reflect higher implicitrental value, so if housing
were treated symmetrically, tax revenues wouldincrease with house
prices.































(a) Mean house value ($1999), 1979
Metropolitan area, sorted by house value
(b) Mean house value ($1999), 1989
Metropolitan area, sorted by house value
(c) Mean house value ($1999),1999
Metropolitan area, sorted by house value
FIGURE 9. Mean House Value, by Metro Area,in 1979, 1989, and 1999206Sinai & Gyourko
4. CONCLUSIONS
Estimating the tax subsidy to homeowners bycomparing the taxes they
now pay with those they would pay if they faced neutral taxtreatment
like landlords in our exampleshowsa substantial increase in the value
of the tax benefit over time. Whilesome of the aggregate increase clearly
is due to a rise in the number of homeowners,benefits per owner are
about 20 percent higher in 1999 than theywere in 1979 at the national
level. This development is particularly interestingbecause it occurs
despite marginal and average tax rates fallingover the past two decades.
The evidence suggests that rising house prices,especially in key coastal
areas and in certain regions of the country, can help account for thefact
that the value of the subsidy has risen,even though the tax subsidy per
dollar of housing has declined.
We demonstrate that the subsidy flows disproportionatelyto owners
in a relatively small number of statesCalifornia,especially. Spatial
skewness is even more extreme at the metropolitanlevel, and the data
indicate that skewness there has increasedover time, though the top
recipient areas tend to remain top recipients. Rising houseprices in cer-
tain coastal metropolitan areas appear to playa large role in explaining
this phenomenon.
While the magnitude and skewness of the subsidyare striking, one note
of caution is in order when interpreting theseresults. While it may appear
that current homeowners insome parts of the country reap a large tax
subsidy, their house prices may be higher. That is, theafter-tax annual cost
of housing in high-subsidy areas may not differ fromlow-subsidy areas
by the full amount of the tax benefit. In theextreme case, if house prices
have fully capitalized the benefit, current homeownersare no better off on
a flow basis.
Computing the incidence of the tax subsidyto owner-occupied hous-
ingthe degree to which the subsidy showsup in higher house prices
rather than as a reduced flow cost of homeownershipisbeyond the
scope of this paper. In addition, no consensus about the issue exists in the
economics literature: estimates range from full capitalizationto extremely
low capitalization.27 Where the incidence lies, however,has crucial impli-
cations for public policy. For example, it would beeasy to jump to the
conclusion that, because of the spatial inequity ofthe tax subsidy to
owner-occupied housing, policymakers should restructure thetax benefit.
But if a reduction in benefit is capitalized into houseprices, current home-
owners may experience a loss of wealth. If those homeowners had been
27For examples, see Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1999) and Capozza,Green, and Hendershott
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the beneficiaries of the rise in house prices when the tax subsidy
increased, such a reduction in asset value might be equitable. It is quite
likely, however, that current homeowners purchased their houses with
the tax benefit already capitalized into the price, paying more on the
expectation of future subsidies.
The degree of the capitalization of the subsidy into house prices is also
unlikely to be spatially neutral. In places where land is in short supply, an
increase in demand for housing is likely to show up more in house prices
than it would in cities, where it is easy to add more housing stock. That
housing demand can be created by local economic factors or the subsidy
to owner-occupied housing. Thus, for the same underlying economic
reasons, places where the tax benefit is the greatest areplaces with high
land prices and also places where the subsidy is more likely to be capital-
ized into the house price. While we cannot say how much of any reduc-
tion in the tax benefit would show up as lower house prices, it seems
likely that a larger fraction (of a larger benefit) would be reflected in house
prices in the high-benefit areas.
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